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Abstract. A Nash equilibrium has become important solution concept for analyzing the decision making in
Game theory. In this paper, we consider the problem of computing Nash equilibria of a subclass of generic
finite normal form games. We define rational payoff irrational equilibria games to be the games with all rational
payoffs and all irrational equilibria. We present a purely algebraic method for computing all Nash equilibria of
these games that uses knowledge of Galois groups. Some results, showing properties of the class of games, and
an example to show working of the method concludes the paper.
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1 Introduction
The problem of computing all equilibria of class of integer payoff irrational equilibria(IPIE) games is stud-
ied in [1]. The approach in [1] is as follows: They characterize equilibria of an IPIE game as solutions
to a system of polynomial equations called a game system GS. With a numerical method they compute a
sample solution of the GS and follow it up by the Galois group action for computing all equilibria solutions.
Existing methods for computing equilibrium, such as the approach based on the homotopy continuation
methods, given in [2],have the drawback of providing solutions via approximation. On the other hand the
method in [3] is highly dependent on a chosen probability distribution.
With the motivation and game model presented in [1], in this work, we extend the approach of using Galois
group for computing all equilibria of the IPIE games to a larger class of rational payoff irrational equilib-
ria(RPIE) games. The approach is a purely algebraic and provides a marginal decrease in computational
time compared to the method based only on Gro¨bner basis [4]. The method computes exact equilibria and
does not depend on probability distributions. We further show that for a subclass of games it computes
equilibria in closed form.1
The number of equilibria in a finite normal form game increases exponentially in the size of the game [2].
This means any method for computing all equilibria, one at a time, are bound to be exponential. In the light
of this result structural relations between equilibria solutions of a game can help us compute all equilibria
in a better way. In this paper, our aim is to present a pure algebraic method that computes all equilibria of
RPIE games using knowledge of its sample equilibrium. Thus, answering partially an important question
of establishing relations between all equilibria solutions, raised by McKelvey and McLennan [5].
To our knowledge, a method for computing equilibria of RPIE games with Galois groups has not been
considered earlier.
1 cf. Proposition 3.
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Organization of the article is as follows. Preliminaries and the game model is presented in Section 2. The
algorithm for computing all equilibria of RPIE games and related results are presented in Section 3. Section
4 contains a worked out example of RPIE game.
2 Preliminaries
The subclass of games that we consider are generic and are known to have finitely many odd number of
irrational equilibria [6]. Our convention is to write totally mixed real-irrational Nash equilibria as irrational
Nash equilibria.
Definition 1. A finite normal form game with
– its all payoff values rational numbers
– its all Nash equilibria irrational numbers
is called an rational payoff irrational equilibria(RPIE) game.
The characterization of equilibria as solutions to a system of polynomial equation and the underlying game
model, that we consider in this paper, is based on [1].
Let T be an RPIE game with n = |N | players. Each player i has ki ≥ 2 strategies, |Si| = ki. We write
K+ = ∑ni=1 ki. Aij1j2...jn denotes the payoff received by player i when each player adopts strategy jm for
1 ≤ jm ≤ km and m = 1, . . . , n. The probability that player i chooses strategy ji ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ki} is denoted
by xiji . By Definition 1 an RPIE game has
0 < xiji < 1. (1)
Moreover, for each player i,
ki∑
ji=1
xiji = 1. (2)
Expected payoff for player i,
αi =
k1∑
j1=1
k2∑
j2=1
. . .
kn∑
jn=1
Aij1j2...jnx
1
j1
x2j2 . . . x
n
jn
(3)
In a Nash equilibrium, the following holds:
αi ≥
k1∑
j1=1
k2∑
j2=1
. . .
ki−1∑
ji−1=1
ki+1∑
ji+1=1
. . .
kn∑
jn=1
Aij1j2...ji−1jiji+1...jnx
1
j1
x2j2 . . . x
i−1
ji−1
xi+1ji+1 . . . x
n
jn
,
for every ji ∈ Si and for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
(4)
With (4), (2) and (1) we get a system of polynomial equation of the form.
αi −
k1∑
j1=1
k2∑
j2=1
. . .
ki−1∑
ji−1=1
ki+1∑
ji+1=1
. . .
kn∑
jn=1
Aij1j2...ji−1jiji+1...jnx
1
j1
x2j2 . . . x
i−1
ji−1
xi+1ji+1 . . . x
n
jn
= 0
for every ji ∈ Si and i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. (5)
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For the purpose of computing all equilibria an RPIE game we shall consider the system of polynomial
equations of the form (5) and call it a game system GS. We shall be specifically interested in the following
field arithmetic for the GS representing RPIE games.
Definition 2. Let K ⊃ F be a finite extension of a field F . Then the Galois group G = Gal(K/F ) is the
set
G = {σ : K → K|σ is an automorphism, σ(a) = a for all a ∈ F}.
We now consider the particular situation when K is an extension of F of the form F (α) where α is a root
of a polynomial p(x) ∈ F [x]. It is known that the Galois group G of the extension K acts as a permutation
group on the roots of the polynomial p(x).
In this work our assumption is that these Galois groups are known, and we further utilize them for
computing solutions of the polynomial system. It is important to note that for computing a Galois group
of n! elements, computation of its 2n generators is sufficient [7]. It is a procedure not requiring exponential
computation . And so the assumption, that the Galois groups are known, is feasible. The polynomials that
we consider are multilinear – in indeterminate variables – over the field of rational numbers Q and generate
irrational equilibria solutions. Thus the polynomial system induces non-trivial Galois groups.
3 Equilibria of RPIE Games
In this section, we outline the algorithm to compute all irrational equilibria of an RPIE game. We further
show correctness of the algorithm and present other results.
3.1 Method
Before formally presenting our algorithm, we briefly discuss the approach and the underlying assumptions.
We assume that we have an RPIE game T . As described in Section 2, we can derive a system of polynomial
equations GS whose solutions include all the Nash equilibria of the game T . Since some of the solutions need
not be Nash equilibria, our algorithm rejects these unwanted solutions using various different mechanisms.
Due to Bernstein’s theorem [8], we get an upper bound on the number of solutions a polynomial system
can have. Bounds on the number of equilibria solutions – out of all polynomial solutions – are available in
[9,10]. An upper bound on the number of solutions and bounds on the number of equilibria solutions give a
bound on the number of solutions to be computed and the number of non-equilibria solutions to be rejected.
In the initial phase of our method, Buchberger’s algorithm is called to derive a univariate polynomial in the
Gro¨bner basis(GB) of the GS.2 Since the game is RPIE, Nash’s theorem [12] guarantees that the univariate
polynomial has at least one irrational root. A root of the univariate polynomial is computed and substituted
in the triangular form of a Gro¨bner basis to find a univariate polynomial in other indeterminate variables.
We repeat this procedure at most K+ − n times, and at the end of it we have an irrational solution of the
GS, a sample solution.
We denote a Galois group of the irreducible part of a univariate polynomial in GB of GS by G. We assume
G’s are known.
2 Recall that the system of polynomial equations GS over complex number field has finitely many solutions. This finite
variety of the GS (or equivalently zero-dimensional ideal I of the GS) guarantees a univariate polynomial in its Gro¨bner
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In the next phase, we apply the transitive Galois group action corresponding to each indeterminate variable
and find Galois-orbits to determine all irrational solutions of the GS.
The final phase consist of determining all non-equilibria solutions and rejecting them. For this we use the
Nash equilibrium verification algorithm in [13]. Following is an outline of the algorithm to compute all
equilibria of an RPIE game with Galois groups.
Algorithm 3.1 Computing All Nash Equilibria of an RPIE game.
Input: An RPIE game, Galois groups.
Output: All equilibria of the input RPIE game.
1: β = (β1, β2, . . . , βK+). {Initialize an empty tuple to store a sample solution of the GS}.
2: Characterize all the Nash Equilibria of the input game as solutions to the GS.
3: Call Algorithm 3.2 with GS for computing a sample equilibrium of the input RPIE game.
4: Call the Galois group action Algorithm 3.3 with the sample solution tuple saved in β.
5: Save output of the Algorithm 3.3 in X.
6: Reject non-equilibria solutions of the GS from X using verification algorithm in [13] or criteria (1) and
(2).
Algorithm 3.2 Computation of a sample solution.
Input: GS of the input game.
Output: A sample solution β = (β1, β2, . . . , βK+) of the input game.
1: With Buchberger’s Algorithm on GS , compute triangular form of GB.
2: while one sample solution β of the GS is not constructed do
3: Compute a root α of univariate polynomial – of some indeterminate variable xi – generated in Step
3.
4: if α ∈ Q then
5: Reject α and go to Step 3.
6: else
7: Save α in β at location βi.
8: end if
9: Substitute the root βi in β into GS and compute a new triangular form with one less indeterminate
variable.
10: end while
The group action algorithm is given in [1]. We reproduce it here for the discussion to be complete. Algorithm
3.3 computes group action by transitive Galois groups. The action is computed for each indeterminate
variable xi by considering it over each coordinate root in the tuple β. The action generates Galois-conjugates
of the roots that are further saved in as solution tuples in the set X.
Traditional approach, given in [4], for computing solutions of system of polynomial equations using GB
calls the Buchberger’s algorithm for computing a triangular form. The triangular form provides a univariate
polynomial in one indeterminate variable. Each root of the univariate polynomial is then substituted back
in the triangular form to compute corresponding solution tuple, requiring multiple substitutions and fac-
torizations. Algorithm 3.2, on the other hand, invokes Buchberger’s algorithm exactly once. The Algorithm
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Algorithm 3.3 Computing orbit of a Galois Group Action.
Input: A sample solution β of the GS.
Output: All the conjugate solutions of the input sample solution in set X.
1: Initialize the processed-elements list X and unprocessed-elements list U as X = U = {β}.
2: while U is not empty do
3: Let u = (u1, u2, . . . , uK+) be the first element of U . Delete u from U .
4: for each i and j, gij in Galois group Gi and ui ∈ u. do
5: Compute the transitive Galois group action u
gij
i .
6: β′ = (u
g1
j
1
, u
g2
j
2
, . . . , u
gK
+
j
K+
).
7: if β′ /∈ X then
8: X = X ∪ {β′} and U = U ∪ {β′}.
9: end if
10: end for
11: end while
3.2 computes a sample solution tuple corresponding to first irrational root of the univariate polynomial.
Rest of the solutions are then generated by polynomial time group action, requiring no further substitutions
and factorizations.
It is important to note that, due to [12] and the fact that the input game has all irrational equilibria, we
are guaranteed to get one solution of the GS in β and so the Algorithm 3.1 reaches Step 4, every time.
Next it calls the Algorithm 3.3 for computing polynomial time Galois group action over available sample
solution in the β. In the Algorithm 3.3 all other conjugate roots are computed with their known Galois
groups Gi.
Moreover, finite group action on finite variety guarantees that the Algorithm 3.3 reaches Step 13. At the
end of Step 13, Algorithm 3.3 generates solutions of polynomial system GS in X, all of which may not be
Nash equilibria. We use polynomial time algorithm, suggested in [13], to reject the non-equilibria solutions.
For checking the condition in Step 4 of the Algorithm 3.2, i.e., for deciding α ∈ Q we consider the following
approach. Compute an approximation of α with suitable numerical method. With the KLL Algorithm
[14] compute the minimal polynomial for α. Check irreducibility of the minimal polynomial over Q with
algorithm in [15]. The irreducibility test decides whether α ∈ Q or not.
The Algorithm 3.2 computes a sample solution of the GS . Various approaches for computing a sample
equilibrium of a game are discussed in [5]. The approach that we consider of using Gro¨bner basis, though
not new, is developed independently. Contrary to the other approaches based on Gro¨bner basis, our ap-
proach, given in Algorithm 3.2, differs primarily in Step 4.
The Algorithm 3.1 shows a method for computing solutions of a system of polynomial equations without
having to factorize the system every time.
3.2 Comparison with the Algorithm in [1]
The Algorithm in [1] calls MVNRM for computing an approximate solution of the GS. MVNRM is followed
by the KLL algorithm for converting an approximate root in to algebraic form. The solution is then tested
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for irrationality. In case otherwise, a new approximate solution is computed.
On the other hand, the Algorithm 3.1 uses Buchberger’s algorithm for computing a Gro¨bner basis(GB).
This converts the GS in triangular form, requiring doubly exponential time in K+. A univariate polynomial
in the triangular form is factorized to find an irrational root. The root is substituted back in the GB for
finding a complete irrational solution. This requires rejection of rational roots, if any.
The difference in both the methods is: the Gro¨bner basis method is purely algebraic and allows lot more
structure to manipulate GS . While the numerical MVNRM provides lot more efficiency, disclosing a little
about the structure of the polynomials, and interrelations of its solutions.
3.3 Results
The Algorithm 3.1 computes all equilibria of RPIE games with n ≥ 3 players. Following results show, why
it can not work for games with n = 2 players.
Proposition 1. A bimatrix game with all rational payoff values has all rational equilibria.
Proof. For computing all equilibria of a bimatrix game, system of linear equations are sufficient [16]. That
is, if all the game payoff values are defined over field F , then all of its equilibria – characterized as solutions
to system of polynomial equations – can be found in the field F only.
⊓⊔
Following is an immediate corollary to the result above.
Corollary 1. Algorithm 3.1 can not be used to compute equilibria of a bimatrix game defined over arbitrary
field.
Proof. From Proposition 1, it is clear that the class of two player games do not produce field extensions.
This means that corresponding Galois groups are trivial, i.e., Gal(F/F) = {e}. This proves the claim. ⊓⊔
Corollary 2. The class of RPIE games is empty for n = 2 players.
Proof. Follows from Definitions 1, 2 and Proposition 1. ⊓⊔
Next result shows correctness of the Algorithm 3.1.
Proposition 2. The Algorithm 3.1 to compute equilibria of the class of RPIE games works, i.e., the
Algorithm 3.1 generates all irrational equilibria and no other solutions at termination.
Proof. An input RPIE game T with n ≥ 3 players is characterized as the GS of form (5). Polynomial
system comes from the inequality on expected payoffs and payoffs at pure strategies. This causes the GS
to have more solutions then just the equilibria.
In the first phase, Algorithm 3.1 calls the Algorithm 3.2. The algorithm 3.2 computes a sample solution β
by first building a Gro¨bner basis for the GS using Buchberger’s algorithm. Buchberger’s algorithm termi-
nates with triangular form analogous to echelon form in the linear case.
Since the game is known to be RPIE and rational solutions of the GS are rejected by the Algorithm 3.2,
the sample solution β must have all irrational coordinates. Consequently, each coordinate βi of the sample
solution β results in an algebraic extenion K = Q(βi) of Q with finite Galois group Gi = Gal(K/Q). Since
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the group action of Gi is transitive, it generates all irrational solutions of the GS .
Zero-dimensional ideal of GS guarantees that the group action terminates. This enables the Algorithm 3.1
to reach Step 5, every time there is a RPIE game T as its input. The algorithm generates solutions of the
GS that contain all the equilibria of the game T .
Finally, Algorithm 3.1 rejects solutions of the GS which are not Nash equilibria. Since the set of Nash
equilibria is known to be non-empty, set X contains all and only the Nash equilibria solutions of the RPIE
game T . ⊓⊔
With the available finite precision technology for representing a number in computer memory, the problem
of storing an irrational equilibria is important [17]. We show that the issue for RPIE games can be resolved
as follows.
Proposition 3. If univariate polynomials in ideal I of GS of an RPIE game has solvable Galois group.
Then the Algorithm 3.1 computes Nash equilibria of the game in closed form.
Proof. Due to Galois correspondence, we know, if a polynomial has solvable Galois group, all its roots can
be computed by radicals. If each univariate polynomial in ideal I of GS of an RPIE game has solvable
Galois group,3 then roots of this set of polynomials can be computed using radicals. This gives all solutions
in closed form, a subset is Nash equilibria of the game. ⊓⊔
It is known that all abelian groups, groups of order < 60, group with odd order (Feit-Thompson theorem)
and groups of order paqb are solvable, where p and q are prime. Moreover, some non-abelian group may
also be solvable [19]. This suggests that Proposition 3 is applicable for a substantial number of games. The
equilibria of games with non-solvable Galois groups can be obtained in algebraic form by first computing
equilibria solutions numerically, and then constructing minimal polynomial for each of the numerical values
with the algorithm in [14].
4 Example
In this section, we show working of Algorithm 3.1 with an example of 3 players 2 strategy RPIE game.
With the Membership algorithm in [1], we verify that the game, given in Table 1 is RPIE.
A B
a 6, -1, 4 0, 9, 0
b 0, 3/2, 0 2, 0, 0
1
A B
a 2, 0, 0 0, 9/2, 0
b 0, 27/2, 0 4, 0, 6
2
Table 1. Payoff table of a 3 player 2 strategy RPIE game. Player 1 and 2’s strategies are indicated by a, b
and A, B respectively. Player 3’s strategies are 1 and 2. Entry in each cell of payoff table indicates player
1, 2 and 3’s respective payoff for their respective strategies.
We let x = x11, y = x
1
2, z = x
1
3 be the first strategy of players 1, 2 and 3 respectively. Probability that players
will choose their second strategy is 1− x, 1− y and 1− z respectively. After characterizing Nash equilibria
as the solutions of a GS of form (5), we apply Buchberger’s algorithm, with x ≺ y ≺ z, to compute a
3 Using polynomial time Landau-Miller Test[18] it can be verified whether given polynomial has solvable Galois group or not.
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univariate polynomial 5x2 − 27x− 27 = 0 in a GB. The univariate polynomial has x = 3
10
(−9±√141) as
its two roots, and is irreducible over Q. Its Galois group ({id,conjugate}) is isomorphic to Z2.
Substituting x = 3
10
(−9−√141) in the triangular form of the GB and solving for univariate polynomials
in y and z we get, y = 1
22
(3 − √141); z = 1
11
(14 +
√
141), a sample solution. Galois group of irreducible
polynomials of polynomial system are known a prior (isomorphic to Z2 for each variable x, y, z over Q).
Rest of the polynomial solutions can be obtained by computing Galois-orbits of the sample solution.
In this example it is simple to observe the criterion (1) and (2) for deciding what solution tuple will form
the equilibria.4 Accepting values between 0 and 1 we get x = 3
10
(−9 + √141); y = 1
22
(3 +
√
141); z =
1
11
(14 −√141). This solution constitutes unique Nash equilibrium of the RPIE game depicted in Table 1.
Note that, Galois group for the game system for this game is solvable, and so, all the equilibria computed
are in closed form.
5 Computational Complexity
A Gro¨bner basis can be computed in doubly exponential time in the size of K+. A Gro¨bner basis contains
polynomials in triangular form, and we are interested in the equilibria points with irrational values. An
advantage of the triangular form is that at every stage of the substitution, unwanted solutions can be
filtered out. For further details of computational complexity of finding Gro¨bner basis see [20].
The group action Algorithm 3.3, in the worst case, requires action of each of the Galois group generator
g′ ∈ G′ ⊆ G to each element of the set of roots [1]. This gives worst case time O(|G′| · |X|). If a univariate
polynomial has n roots then |G′| is linear in n [7,21], while |X| is polynomial in n.
The algorithm for computing Nash equilibria with Gro¨bner basis, given in [4], substitutes all the roots in
triangular form and solves univariate polynomial for each substitution. If Galois group is known for the
polynomials then our approach computes solutions with relatively simple and efficient group action. The
feature in our algorithm exploits information available in a sample solution. Our approach performs better
then algorithm based only on Gro¨bner basis. If each univariate in Gro¨bner bases of the game system has
di distinct roots (i ∈ {1, . . . ,K+}), then method for computing Nash equilibria with only Gro¨bner basis
takes Πidi substitutions and factorization. On the other hand, in our approach, after computing a sample
solution, no further substitution or factorization is required.
6 Conclusion
We defined a class of rational payoff irrational equilibria games and proposed a purely algebraic method for
computing its all equilibria. The method that we presented throws more light on structure of equilibria and
shows a way to effectively utilizes knowledge of a sample equilibrium. We discussed results that show why
our algorithm can not be used for any bimatrix games, and how it can be utilized to compute equilibria
in closed form. Working of our algorithm was demonstrated with an example of 3 players 2 strategy RPIE
game. For the class of games that we consider, the algorithm we suggest is new. It would be interesting to
see working of our algorithm on graphical forms and extensive form games, with necessary modifications.
4 For larger system the Nash equilibrium verification algorithm comes handy.
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